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CASE COMMENTS
MISTAKE OF AGE AS A DEFENSE TO STATUTORY RAPE
The uniform rule in the United States has been that a mistake as
to the age of a female is not a defense to the crime of statutory
rape.' It has been followed even though the defendant had a reason-
able belief,2 had exercised care to find out her age,3 or had been told
by the female that she was over age.4 This rule is an exception to the
general defense of mistake of fact,5 which states that if the defendant
'Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918); People v. Ratz, 115 Cal.
132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896); Manship v. People, 58 P.2d 1215 (Colo. 1936); Askew v.
State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 196o); People v. Lewellyn, 314 Ill. so6, 145 N.E. 289
(1924); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (191)o; Commonwealth v. Murphy,
165 Mass. 66, 4. N.E. 504 (1896); People v. Gengels, 218 Mich. 632, 188 N.W.
398 (1922); State v. Houx, 1o9 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892); State v. Duncan, 82 Mont.
170, 266 Pac. 400 (1928) ;
People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 13o N.Y. Supp. 524 (1911); State v. Wade,
224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944); Zent v. State, 3 Ohio App. 473 (1914); Law v.
State, 92 Okla. Crim. 444, 224 P.2d 278 (1950); Edens v. State, 43 S.W. 89 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1897); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 845 (1878); United
States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941) (dictum); State v. Suennen, 36
Idaho 219, 209 Pac. 1072 (1922) (dictum); State v. Dombroski, 145 Minn. 278, 176
N.W. 985 (1920) (dictum); accord, Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963)
(contributing to delinquency of minor by persuading her to engage in sexual in-
tercourse);
Brown v. State, 23 Del. (7 Penne.) 159, 74 AtI. 836 (19o9) (harboring a pros-
titute under age of eighteen); State v. Sherman, 1o6 Iowa 684, 77 N.W. 461 (1898)
(assault with intent to commit rape on a female under age of thirteen); State v.
Johnson, 85 Kan. 54, 116 Pac. 21O (1911) (receiving female under eighteen for
purpose of prostitution); Commonwealth v. Sarricks, 161 Pa. Super. 577, 56 A.2d
323 (1948) (contributing to delinquency of minor by engaging in sexual intercourse).
'Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 31o (191o); State v. Houx, 1o9 Mo. 654,
19 S.W. 35 (1892)-
3Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 302, 65 S.W. 920 (0O).
'People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 13o N.Y. Supp. 524 (1911); Edens v. State,
43 S.W. 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897).
'E.g., Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897); People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326,
193 N.E. 150 (1934); Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 466, 1o S.E. 745 (1890).
"'That a mistake of facts on reasonable grounds, to the extent that, if the
facts were as believed, the acts of the prisoner would make him guilty of no offense
at all, is an excuse...... The Queen v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168, 19o (1889). See
Perkins, Criminal Law 825 (1957); 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 5157
(Anderson ed. 1957).
"The defendant's criminality must be determined by his state of mind toward
the situation in which he acted, and his state of mind will depend upon his im-
pression of the facts. Hence he should be dealt with as if the facts were what he
believed them to be. Then if, according to his belief concerning the facts, his
act is criminal, he has the criminal mind as distinguished from motive, desire,
or intention, and should be punished. If, on the other hand, his act would be in-
nocent provided the facts were what he believed them to be, he does not have the
criminal mind, and consequently should not be punished for his act." Keedy,
Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 82 (1908).
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believed there existed certain facts, which had they been true would
have rendered the action lawful, then he was not guilty because he was
incapable of entertaining the intent 6 necessary to constitute the crime.
The recent California case of People v. Hernandez brings into
question the validity of the rule that mistake as to the age of the
female is no defense. The defendant was charged with statutory rape.s
During the trial the defendant attempted to present evidence that he
had a reasonable good faith belief the girl was over eighteen years
old. The trial court's refusal to allow the introduction of this evi-
dence was the sole grounds for appeal. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in a unanimous decision held that it was improper to exclude
this offer of proof. The conviction was reversed, and the sixty-eight
year old precedent of People v. Ratz9 was overruled. The basis for the
decision was the application of the defense of mistake of fact to the
crime of statutory rape. "[I]f he participates in a mutual act of sexual
intercourse, believing his partner to be beyond the age of consent, with
reasonable grounds for such belief, where is his criminal intent?"' 0
"[I]n the absence of a legislative direction otherwise, a charge of sta-
tutory rape is defensible wherein a criminal intent is lacking."" The
court, feeling that the previous decisions in California did not give
proper emphasis to intent, reasserted the necessity and importance of
establishing intent.
12
For a discussion of the mental element in crime see Remington, The Mental
Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 644; Sayre, Mens Rea,
45 Harv. L Rev. 974 (1932).
739 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
'Cal. Pen. Code § 261. "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with
a female not the wife of the perpetrator, under either of the following circum-
stances:
i. Where the female is under the age of eighteen years;
2. Where she is incapable, through lunacy or other unsoundness of mind,
whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent;
3. Where she resists but her resistance is overcome by force or violence;
4. Where she is prevented from resisting by threats of great and im-
mediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution, or by any
intoxicating narcotic, or anesthetic substance, administered by or with the
privity of the accused;
5. Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this
is known to the accused;
6. Where she submits under the belief that the person committing the act
is her husband, and this belief is induced by an artifice, pretense, or conceal-
ment practiced by the accused, with intent to induce such belief."
9115 Cal. 32, 56 Pac. 915 (1896).
1 People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364, 393 P.2d 673, 676 (1964).
1id. at 365, 393 P.2d at 677.
'The California court's renewed emphasis on the necessity of intent can be
seen in the case of People v Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 85o (1956). This was a
CASE COMMENTS
An examination of the cases holding that mistake of age is no
defense reveals that two different approaches have been used to reach
this result. The first view states that the defendant acted at his peril
and is strictly liable for his act.13 This approach, in effect, holds that
neither general nor specific intent is a necessary element of the crime.
The second view recognizes general intent as a necessary element, but
it holds that, while the defendant did not have the intent to commit
statutory rape, he did have an intent to do something wrong. This in-
tent to do a lesser wrong is enough to establish the mental element
necessary for statutory rape.14
Strict liability is the most popular rationale used to reject mis-
take of age as a defense. This rationale holds that no criminal intent
is required to establish the crime. Since mistake of fact is a defense
only in so far as it negates intent, it has no effect in this type of crime.
Until the principal case, California had used this approach. People v.
Ratz held that the defendant acted at his peril and would "not be
heard against the evidence to urge his belief that the victim of his out-
rage had passed the period which would make his act a crime."'1 The
Ratz case relied on Regina v. Prince'6 as its authority for this hold-
ing. The Prince case did not involve statutory rape but abduction of
a girl under the age of sixteen. The jury found that the defendant had
a reasonable bona fide belief that the girl was eighteen. This was
held by a majority of the court, fifteen to one, not to constitute a
defense. The opinion of Blackburn, J. stated that neither this crime
nor that of statutory rape were intended by Parliament to depend
upon the defendant's knowledge of the female's age. "It seems impos-
sible to suppose that the intention of the legislature in those two sec-
tions [abduction and statutory rape] could have been to make the
crime depend upon the knowledge of the prisoner of the girl's actual
age."'17 It is important to note that the English court is not holding that
bigamy case where the husband had a good faith belief that his first marriage
was ended when in fact it was not. Mistake of fact generally has not been consid-
ered a defense for bigamy. See Perkins, Criminal Law 835-40 (1957); Annot., 56
A.L.R.2d 915 (1957).
"E.g., Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918); Heath v. State, 173
Ind. 296, go N.E. 31o (1910); People v. Gengels, 218 Mich. 632, 188 N.W. 398 (1922);
People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. ii, i3o N.Y. Supp. 524 (1911); Lawrence v. Common-
wealth, 71 Va. (3o Gratt.) 845 (1878).
"4E.g., Brown v. State, 23 Del. (7 Penne.) 159, 74 Atl. 836 (gog) ; State v. John-
son, 85 Kan. 54, i6 Pac. 21o (1911); State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 SAV. 35 (1892);
Edens v. State, 43 S.W. 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897).
15115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915, 916 (1896).
1L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).
171d. at 171.
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Parliament meant this to be a crime for which no intent whatsoever
is necessary, but only that knowledge' s of the girl's age is not a neces-
sary element. 19 The Ratz case in relying on Prince did not recognize
that the English court had limited itself to excluding only a specific
intent based on knowledge. The Prince case actually held a general
intent to be necessary. When it is misread for the proposition that no
intent is necessary, the result is that statutory rape is interpreted as a
crime for which no intent, either general or specific is required, so
that the defendant is liable regardless of his belief as to the facts. 20
Not all courts have followed the phraseology of the Ratz reason-
ing, but they have reached the same result, holding that the legislature
intended to eliminate intent as an element of the crime of statutory
rape. Some of these decisions2' have equated statutory rape to public
welfare offenses such as the sale of adulterated food and sale of liquor
to minors.2 2 None of them adequately discuss the question of intent.23
Normally, intent is not excluded as an element of a crime unless the
statute expressly provides that intent is excluded or unless it is a nec-
essary implication 2 4
'The word knowledge can have several meanings when referring to criminal
intent. See Perkins, Criminal Law, 681 (1957).
3'The opinion of Blackburn, J., with whom nine judges concurred states that
the basis of the crime is taking the girl out of the possession of her father against
his will. The intent necessary is the intent to unlawfully take her knowing that he
trespassed on the father's rights. "[Hie took her, knowing he trespassed on the
father's rights, and had no colour of excuse for so doing." Note 16 supra at 170.
Mistake of age is not a defense because it did not negate the intent which con-
stituted this crime. Bramwell, B., with seven judges concurring felt that a mistake
which did negate the intent constituting the crime would be a defense. "If the
taker believed he had the father's consent, though wrongly, he would have no
mens rea; so if he did not know she was in anyone's possession, nor in the care or
charge of anyone." Id. at 175-
2"As in the Ratz case the courts often justify convictions on policy reasons
which in effect eliminate the element of intent." People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 364, 393 P.2d 673, 676 (1964).
21McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 6oi (1873); State v. Sherman, 1o6 Iowa 684, 77
N.W. 461 (1898); Zent v. State, 3 Ohio App. 473 (1914). Commonwealth v. Sarricks,
161 Pa. Super. 577, 56 A.2d 323 (1948).
mFor full discussion of public welfare crimes see Sayre, Public Welfare Of-
fenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933).
'"[I]he courts have uniformly failed to satisfactorily explain the nature of
the criminal intent present in the mind of one who in good faith believes he has
obtained a lawful consent before engaging in the prohibited act." People v. Her-
nandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364, 393 P.2d 673, 676 (1964).
w'Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concur-
rence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense
individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states codified
the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their
courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but
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Statutory rape is a common law offense, 25 it is malum in se,26 and
it is regarded as a grave offense.2 7 These three tests are used to deter-
mine whether a crime is one requiring mens rea.28 By all three, statu-
tory rape seems to require a mental element. A more valid test than
these three for determining whether a mental element is necessary is to
look first at the character of the offense and then at the nature of the
penalty.29 If the offense is merely one of a regulatory nature, not
aimed at singling out individual wrongdoers, and if the crime involves
light fines rather than imprisonment, the crime is usually considered
to require no intent. However, statutory rape is not of a regulatory
nature and involves heavy penalties.S0
merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it
required no statutory affirmation. Courts, with little hesitation or division, found
an implication of the requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the
common law." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952). Where statutes
are silent as to the requirement of intent the court must determine the intent
of the legislature. E.g., Leonard v. State, 38 Ala. App. 138, 79 So. 2d 803 (1955);
People v. Daniels, ,1 8 Cal. App. 2d 340, 257 P.2d 1038 (1953); Commonwealth v. Fine,
s66 Pa. Super. 109, 7o A.2d 677 (195o); State v. Winger, 41 Wash. 229, 248 P.2d
555 (1952).
-'The first time carnal knowledge of a female child was made a crime was in
1275 with the statute of Westminister I, 3 Edw. i, c. 13. The Statute of 18 Eliz., c. 7,
§ IV (1576) specified the age of consent and made the crime a felony. These statutes
were passed early enough for the crime to be considered a common law offense.
"Rape is felony by the Common Law, declared by Parliament, for the unlawful and
carnal knowledge and abuse of any woman above the age of ten years against
her will, or of a woman-child under age of ten years with her will, or against
her will...." 3 Coke, Institutes, 6o (4th ed. 1669). Nider v. Commonwealth, 140
Ky. 684, 131 S.W. 1024 (1910); Commonwealth v. Roosnell, 143 Mass. 32, 8 N.E.
747 (1886); Commonwealth v. Bennet, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 235 (1820).
m" 'An offense malum in se is properly defined as one which is naturally evil, as
adjudged by the sense of a civilized community. An act which is malum prohibitum
is wrong only because made so by statute.'" State v. Trent, 259 Pac. 893, 898
(Ore. 1927). "'[G]enerally speaking, crimes malum in se involve "moral turpitude."' "
In re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah, 1943). "Malum in se is defined as: 'An
act involving illegality from the very nature of the transaction, upon principles
of natural, moral, and public law.'" Whitlock v. State, 187 Tenn. 522, 216 S.W.2d
22, 24 (1948). See generally Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 337-42 (2d ed.
196o); Perkins, Criminal Law 692-99 (1957).
"'The crime is "too infamous to bear discussion." People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132,
46 Pac. 915, 916 (1896).
uSayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 70-72 (1933).
--"The line distinguishing offenses which do and those which do not require
mens rea in the absence of statutory direction depends upon (a) the character of
the offense, and (b) the nature of the penalty involved in its violation. In general,
offenses not requiring mens rea are minor violations of laws regulating the sale
of intoxicating liquor, impure or adulterated food, milk, drugs or narcotics, crim-
inal nuisances, violations of traffic or motor-vehicle regulations, or of general police
regulations passed for the safety, health, or well-being of the community and not
in general involving moral delinquency." Id. at 83.
1°E.g., statutory rape punishable at jury's discretion for not more than one year
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Strict liability is a means of reaching a result which public policy
demands: the protection of young girls who are too naive to com-
prehend fully the act of sexual intercourse.3 ' Since protection can
still be afforded even if intent is recognized as an element,3 2 there is
no reason for continuing to interpret statutory rape as a strict liability
crime.
3 3
The second rationale used to reject mistake of age as a defense
recognizes that a general intent is an element of the crime, and if the
defendant lacks this general intent, he is not guilty.3 4 The question
is whether a mistaken belief as to the female's age constitutes a mis-
take of fact sufficient to negate this general intent.3 5 The courts fol-
lowing this view have universally held that it does not. Even though
the defendant, who reasonably believed the girl was overage, did not in-
tend to commit statutory rape, he did intend to do something wrong:3 0
in county jail or not more than fifty years in state prison. Cal. Pen. Code § 264.
Punishable at jury's discretion for not less than five years and up to death. Va.
Code Ann. § 18.1-44 (rep1. vol. 196o).
""The protection of society, of the family, and of the infant, demand that one
who has carnal intercourse under such circumstances shall do so in peril of the
fact...." People v. Katz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915, 916 (1896). "Public policy re-
quires it." Sayre, note 28 supra at 74.
""With reference to the strict liability imposed, it has been noted in the above
discussion of that subject that no evidence supporting the assumed need for such
arbitrariness is available. In these circumstances, one may certainly believe that
application of the usual restriction of ignorantia facti to reasonable mistakes would
result in convictions in the vast majority of such cases." Hall, General Principles of
Criminal Law 374 (2d ed. 196o).
1The California court adheres to the policy of protecting naive underage
girls and feels this can still be done when intent is recognized as an element. "Our
departure from the views expressed in Ratz is in no manner indicative of a with-
drawal from the sound policy that it is in the public interest to protect the sexually
naive female from exploitation.... [Tjhere is nothing in the record to indicate that
the purposes of the law as stated in Ratz can be better served by foreclosing the
defense of a lack of intent." People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365, 393 P.2d
673, 677 (1964).
"Brown v. State, 23 Del. (7 Penne.) 159, 74 Ati. 836 (19o9); State v. Johnson, 85
Kan. 54, 116 Pac. 21o (1911); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E.
504 (1896); State v. Houx, 1O9 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892); State v. Wade, 224 N.C.
760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944); Edens v. State, 43 S.W. 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897). See
generally Perkins, Criminal Law 832-35 (1957).
35Conceivably there could be an innocent mistake of fact sufficient to be a
defense. If the defendant was married, and through a mistake of identity had
intercourse with a female below the age of consent, whom he believed to be his
wife, he would be excused because, "there was no offense, for none was intended,
either in law or morals." State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447, 450 (1859) •
"The testimony offered [that the defendant had a reasonable belief the prose-
cutrix was overage] was, therefore, irrelevant-for the only effect of it would have
been to show that he intended one wrong, and by mistake committed another."
State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 449, 451 (1859).
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to commit fornication. This intent to do wrong is enough to estab-
lish the general intent necessary for statutory rape.37 The mistake of
age is "merely a mistake as to the extent of the wrong and is not suf-
ficient to excuse the actual wrong.
3 8
This is the best rationale for the approach that denies mistake of
age as a defense. It is in line with the reasoning of the leading case
on the subject, Regina v. Prince, and it adequately deals with the
requirement of general intent. In those states which no longer recog-
nize a single act of fornication as being a crime,39 it is apparent that
the defendant could not have intended to do a criminal wrong. At the
most, his intent was to do a moral wrong. Such an intent may be
enough to establish the general intent necessary for the crime of sta-
tutory rape, but the cases are not definite on this point.40
Hernandez did not have an intent to do a criminal wrong, because
fornication is not a crime in California.41 By not discussing whether
his act was immoral or whether the intent to do a moral wrong would
be sufficient to establish the mental element necessary for statutory
rape, the court adopts a view consistent with the trend that purely
moral and religious standards will not be enforced by the courts.
42
The court will still support the policy of protecting naive females,
43
3" 'His intent to violate the laws of morality and the good order of society,
though with the consent of the girl, and though in a case when he supposes he
shall escape punishment, satisfies the demands of the law, and he must take the
consequence.'" State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35, 37 (1892).
4Perkins, Criminal Law 127 (1957).
nE.g., In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897 (1962); State v. Kleiman, 241
N.C. 277, 85 S.E.2d 148 (1954).
'0State v. Johnson, 85 Kan. 54, i16 Pac. 210 (1911) ; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654,
19 S.W. 35 (1892); Edens v. State, 43 S.V. 89 (Tex. Crim App. 1897), indicate that an
intent to do a moral wrong is sufficient to establish the general intent. Brown v.
State, 23 Del. (7 Penne.) i59, 74 Ad. 836 (s9o9); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165
Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896) indicate that an intent to do a moral wrong is not
sufficient and that an intent to do a criminal wrong is necessary to establish general
intent. In Regina v. Prince the majority felt that an intent to do a moral wrong was
sufficient, but the dissent of Brett, J., urged that this was not sufficient. He felt that
the defendant was guilty only if there was an intent to do a criminal wrong for
which the defendant would be separately indicted. Queen v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168,
181 (1889) (explaining Prince).
""[N]either simple fornication or adultery alone nor living in a state of co-
habitation and fornication has been made a crime in this state." In re Lane 58
Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 900 (1962).
"2This view is adopted by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code. "The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to enforce purely
moral or religious standards. We deem it inappropriate for the government to
attempt to control behavior that has no substantial significance except as to the
morality of the actor." Model Penal Code § 207.1, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4
1955).
43See note 33 supra.
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